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REFORM OF PUBLIC COMPANY DISCLOSURE IN EUROPE
BY ROBERTA S. KARMEL*
1. INTRODUCTION
The European Union ("EU") is embarked on a number of pro-
jects to reform public company disclosure and to streamline securi-
ties offerings. The United States ("U.S.") has similarly been en-
gaged in the reform of public company disclosure. The pace and
quantity of rule making in both jurisdictions has been hectic and
could be analyzed as an exercise in competitive regulation in a
global capital marketplace.' Competition between U.S. and EU
regulators, however, does not adequately explain the dynamics of
disclosure reform programs in the U.S. and the EU. Rather, regula-
tory reform on both sides of the Atlantic is being driven by local
and political imperatives. Although regulators are aware of global
needs and market pressures, their decisionmaking is based more
on domestic than on international considerations.
In the U.S., much of the reform of the past few years has been a
reaction to market place scandals and concerns about the stability
* Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor of Law and Chair of the Steering
Committee of the Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn
Law School. She is a former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. The research assistance of Brooklyn Law School student Nirna Ashok is
gratefully acknowledged. The Author also thanks Dean Joan Wexler for a re-
search stipend which was of assistance in completing this project.
1 Arguments favoring competition in international securities regulation have
been made by some academic scholars. See, e.g., Steven J. Choi & Andrew T.
Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regula-
tion, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 903, 904-951 (1998) (recommending a competitive regula-
tory system allowing issuers and investors to choose which country's securities
laws will govern their transactions); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investor: A
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2418-27 (1998) (discuss-
ing the desirability of global regulatory competition and the advantage of allow-
ing issuers to choose which jurisdiction's securities laws will govern). Empirical
research questions the validity of the theory. See Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan,
Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in
1999-Part 1, 56 Bus. LAW. 653, 653-696 (2001) (finding that issuer choice of law in
the European Union ("EU") has not resulted in regulatory competition).
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of retirement savings, leading to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley")2 and subsequent rulemaking by the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 3 More recently, the
Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC is returning to the job
of streamlining the offering process because of changing technol-
ogy.4
In Europe, the driving force for reform was the desire to har-
monize disclosure policy and to create a European-wide capital-
raising mechanism before the enlargement of the EU made such a
task even more difficult.5 This push for reform led to the devel-
opment of the Financial Services Action Plan ("FSAP") in 1999 and
its implementation in accordance with the Lamfalussy Process.6 In
addition, in 2003 the EU Commission issued a Company Law Ac-
tion Plan ("CLAP") for modernizing company law and enhancing
corporate governance in the EU.7
Disclosure reform in Europe has been patterned to a significant
extent on the legislative framework of U.S. securities laws. Al-
though some widely acknowledged defects of the U.S. legislative
scheme have been replicated, since the EU has not established an
administrative agency like the SEC to rationalize, implement, and
enforce framework legislation, problems may well emerge in the
administration of the FSAP directives. 8 Furthermore, the substan-
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
3 See JOHN T. BOSTELMAN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DESKBOOK chs. 1, 2, app. A
(2003).
4 See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange
Act Release No. 50,624, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,649, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722 (proposed Nov. 17, 2004) (proposing rules that would modernize the regis-
tration, communications, and offering processes under the Securities Act and pro-
vide more timely investment information to investors in response to advances in
technology).
5 See generally Roger J. Goebel, Joining the European Union: The Accession Pro-
cedure for the Central European and Mediterranean States, 1 INT'L L. REV. 15, 15-54
(2003-04) (discussing the accession of ten new Member States to the EU and the
economic difficulties they will face in the transition).
6 See infra Sections 2.1-2.2.
7 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European
Union - A Plan to Move Forward, at 36, COM (2003) 284 final (May 31, 2003) [here-
inafter Modernising Company Law].
8 The Author has previously argued in favor of an EU-wide securities com-
mission. Roberta S. Karmel, The Case For a European Securities Commission, 38
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 11-43 (1999).
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tive provisions of the new EU directives have not been harmonized
with U.S. law in many important respects. Nevertheless, the Lam-
falussy Process has streamlined the production of framework di-
rectives, and the result should be improved financial disclosure in
the EU capital markets. In addition, the substantive disclosure re-
quirements in the EU are closer to the SEC's substantive require-
ments than were previously the case.
Yet, even if the disclosure requirements for public companies in
the EU and U.S. were to converge, markedly different enforcement
mechanisms for such legal requirements would likely lead to dif-
ferent disclosure documents. In addition to the lack of an EU-wide
securities agency, civil enforcement of disclosure requirements by
private parties is a matter of national law in the EU. The EU direc-
tives which will be discussed in this Article do not contain liability
laws as do U.S. securities laws.
Section 2 of this Article will briefly explain the FSAP, the Lam-
falussy Process, and the CLAP. Section 3 will describe the Prospec-
tus Directive, the Transparency Directive, and those portions of the
Market Abuse Directive and the CLAP that relate to public com-
pany disclosure. The Author will analyze how these new direc-
tives differ from their predecessor directives, and the ways in
which U.S. and EU substantive law, with respect to offerings and
annual and periodic reporting, both converge and diverge. Section
4 will question whether a unified capital market in Europe can be
fully developed without the creation of an EU-wide securities
commission or harmonized liability mechanisms, and will further
question whether U.S.-EU convergence of disclosure policy is pos-
sible in the absence of an EU-wide securities commission.
2. THE FSAP, THE LAMFALUSSY PROCESS, AND THE CLAP
2.1. The FSAP
The FSAP consists of a series of policy objectives and specific
measures to improve the single market for financial services in the
EU. It is comprised of forty-two separate measures designed to
harmonize EU member states' regulation of securities, banking, in-
surance, mortgages, pensions, and all other forms of financial
transactions. By the end of 2004, forty of the forty-two measures
had been adopted at the EU Commission level.9 These measures
9 See Charlie McCreevy, Eur. Comm'r for Internal Mkt. Servs., Speech at the
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
include a harmonized financial disclosure regime for listed issuers
based on common international accounting standards, 10 the Pro-
spectus Directive," and the Transparency Directive.12 In addition,
a proposal for a directive on statutory audits would clarify the du-
ties of statutory auditors, and standards for their independence
and ethics, by providing for public oversight of the audit profes-
sion and improving cooperation within the EU between such bod-
ies.13
The goal of the FSAP is to create integrated, efficient, deep, and
liquid financial markets in the EU 14 in order to deliver a broad
range of safe and competitive products to consumers and achieve
easier access to a single market for investment capital. Among the
priorities of the FSAP are: revising the common legal framework
for integrated securities and derivatives markets; removing out-
standing barriers to raising capital on an EU-wide basis; ensuring
the continued stability of the European markets; moving toward a
single set of financial statements for listed European companies;
creating a secure and transparent environment for cross-border re-
structuring; and providing legal security for cross-border security
trading.'5
Although one objective of the FSAP is to make the EU markets
Press Conference on the Internal Market Strategy Implementation - Scoreboard
Gan. 27, 2005), (discussing the success of the EU in implementing internal market
strategies) available at http://www.euireland.ie/news/market/0105/internal
marketstrategyimplemenspeech.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2005) (discussing the
success of the EU in implementing internal market strategies).
10 Regulation No. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Application of International Accounting Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1.
11 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Prospectus
to be Published When Securities Are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading
and Amending Directive 2001/34, 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L354) 64 (EC) [hereinafter
Prospectus Directive].
12 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmoni-
sation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers
Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending
Directive 2001/34, 2004/109, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (EC) [hereinafter Transparency
Directive].
13 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on the Statutory Audit of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts and Amending
Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, at 2, COM (2004) 177 final (Mar. 16,
2004).
14 See SEC. EXPERT GROUP, FINANCIAL SERVICES ACTION PLAN: PROGRESS AND
PROSPECTS, FINAL REPORT 5, 6 (2004), available at http://www.europeansecuritis
ation.com/pubs/FSAPstocktaking-Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 23 2005).
15 Id.
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more competitive with the U.S. markets, the overriding goal is to
unify the markets within Europe. EU policymakers envision a sin-
gle capital market where companies can efficiently raise new capi-
tal and where retail, as well as institutional investors will be pro-
tected. The development of such a market is important because the
aging of the population in Europe has created a need for private
retirement savings schemes and the sclerosis of parts of European
industry makes the raising of new cases a priority for policy mak-
ers.
Despite the introduction of the euro and the establishment of a
European Central Bank, the creation of a single European capital
market has been difficult because of rivalries between European
stock exchanges, incompatible corporate finance systems in some
of the key European economies, and language barriers. Neverthe-
less, the switch by exchanges from floor to electronic trading,
which greatly facilitates cross border transactions, the ongoing
consolidation of exchanges, and the globalization of the capital
markets, has made the dream of a European capital market with
harmonized securities regulation more realistic. The open question
is whether the FSAP and its implementation according to the Lam-
falussy Process will achieve these goals.
2.2. The Lamfalussy Process
The usual legislative processes of the EU are complex. Most
laws take the form of directives which are not self-executing and
originate with the Commission. They are then vetted by the Par-
liament and finally adopted by the EU Council. To facilitate the
implementation of the FSAP in Member States, the European
Council of Economics and Finance Ministers established a Com-
mittee of Wise Men, chaired by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy. The
Lamfalussy Committee recommended that new securities regula-
tion be adopted in Member States in four stages or levels, and the
Lamfalussy Process is being followed. The purpose of the Lamfa-
lussy Process is to streamline decisionmaking techniques, espe-
cially at the regulatory level.
Level one consists of directives or regulations 6 issued by the
EU Parliament and Council, acting on proposals from the Commis-
16 Regulations are directly applicable as law in all Member States. Directives
are binding, but leave each of the Member States to determine the method for in-
corporating them into national law. PAUL B. STEPHAN ET AL., THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 253 (2003).
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sion. This legislative work usually takes the form of directives, al-
though it may also take the form of regulations. The Lamfalussy
Report recommended that FSAP directives be drafted at a level of
generality, concentrating on key issues of principle and outlining
areas where more detailed rules are required. These should be
"framework directives" and not detailed prescriptive rules. Regu-
latory implementation of these directives has been delegated to
two committees: a regulatory committee composed of representa-
tives of EU national ministers of finance and an advisory commit-
tee composed of national financial supervisors. This regime of
delegated rulemaking is called "comitology" and is operative in
banking, securities and insurance, and some other fields.17 In the
securities field, the committee of national ministers of finance is the
European Securities Committee, and the committee of national fi-
nancial supervisors is the Committee of European Securities Regu-
lators ("CESR").
The passage of rules at level two involves consultation with
various groups and committees. Specifically, the Lamfalussy
Committee proposed that before the European Securities Commit-
tee adopts any regulations it must consult with CESR, "which in
turn must consult with investors, issuers, and market profession-
als." 18 This process is similar to the notice and comment process
utilized by the U.S. SEC pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act. 19 CESR then submits technical advice in the form of draft
rules to the Commission for consideration and transmission to the
European Securities Committee for approval.20 Once the European
Securities Committee approves a rule, it enters it into force without
any further decision of Council or Parliament.21 The legal basis for
17 See Council Decision 1999/468, 1999 O.J. (L 184) 23, 23 (EC) (conferring
upon the European Commission the power to implement the rules they promul-
gate). The EU members have delegated certain powers to the Commission, and
every legal act, directive, or regulation of the Commission must indicate the ex-
tent of the implementing powers conferred. When a committee assists the Com-
mission in the exercise of any such implementing powers, the Comitology Deci-
sion provides criteria for the choice of committee procedures. See John F. Mogg,
Regulating Financial Services in Europe: A New Approach, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 58,
63-64 (2002) (discussing the process of comitology in general).
18 Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Harmonization of European Securities Law,
37 INT'L LAW. 211, 219 (2003).
19 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
20 Warren, supra note 18, at 219.
21 Eddy Wymeersch, Developments in European Financial Regulation 1 (Fin. Law
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the regulation, however, must be found in a directive approved by
the Council and Parliament. 22 This is similar to the requirement
that the SEC act according to delegated authority in the statutes
under which it operates. 23
At level three, the securities regulators within the member
states work with the relevant EU institutions and within CESR to
produce greater coordination of regulations and the development
of common standards and approaches. This process involves ex-
changes of information and experiences among CESR members,
and agreements on conduct rules that supervisors will use in estab-
lishing national regulations or supervisory action.24
Level four involves continual monitoring and enforcement by
the Commission to ensure that the EU laws passed at levels one
and two are implemented.25 If a member state has not complied
with its obligations under the directives, the Commission can sue
the member in the European Court of Justice.26 An interesting
question is whether private actions can be brought for failure to
implement level one or two standards.27
Although this scenario sounds even more cumbersome than
the normal convoluted EU legislative processes, the Lamfalussy
Process was meant to be a fast track process and it worked surpris-
ingly well in terms of generating framework directives to imple-
ment the FSAP. Nevertheless, the European Securities Committee
is far from an EU-wide regulator or SEC. It has no administrative
or enforcement powers, and the directives that have been passed to
implement the FSAP still need to be adopted in the national laws
Inst., Working Paper Series, No. WP 2004-10, 2004) available at
http:/ / www.law.ugent.be/fli/WP/WP2004-pdf/WP2004-10.pdf.
22 Id.
23 See Nat'l Rural Elec. Coop. Ass'n v. SEC, 276 F.3d 609, 614 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(holding that as long as an agency's findings are supported by substantial evi-
dence and are in accordance with the law, the court will accept them); Am. Bank-
ers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the SEC was not
delegated the authority to regulate banks as broker-dealers by the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934).
24 Wymeersch, supra note 21, at 2.
25 Warren, supra note 18, at 219.
26 Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 226, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002
O.J. (C 325) 33.
27 In some limited cases a state can be liable in damages for failure to imple-
ment a directive. See Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Frankovich v. Italy, 1991
E.C.R. 1-5357, 1-5359, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66, 68 (stating the three conditions neces-
sary for a member state to be held liable when it does not follow a directive).
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
of the twenty-five EU member states. Although the members of
CESR have the power to adopt national regulations, at the EU level
CESR is only an advisory committee. Further, the powers given to
national securities regulators are not the same in all member states.
This legal framework has led to regulatory fatigue and overload in
the EU.28
2.3. The CLAP
The CLAP is a program set forth in a Communication by the
EU Commission to the Council and Parliament ("the Communica-
tion"), in the area of company law and corporate governance.29
The CLAP is separate from but related to the FSAP. Its purpose is
to foster global efficiency and competitiveness of businesses in the
EU by strengthening shareholders' rights and third party (credi-
tors, for example) protection. On the one hand, the Communica-
tion asserts that the CLAP will "contribute to rebuilding European
investor confidence in the wake of a wave of recent corporate gov-
ernance scandals," 30 but on the other hand, after paying homage to
international corporate governance standards, it criticizes Sar-
banes-Oxley for its "outreach effects on European companies and
auditors." 31 The CLAP is intended to create robust, equivalent in-
ternational rules.
Much of the CLAP is directed at modernizing company law,
and this will undoubtedly be a slow process, particularly since the
CLAP is not subject to the Lamfalussy Process. Some of the Com-
mission's Communication is directed at corporate disclosure re-
form. In particular, the Communication stated that listed compa-
nies should be required to disclose in their annual reports "a
coherent and descriptive statement covering the key elements of
their corporate governance structure and practices," including the
operation of the annual meeting; the composition and operation of
the board and board committees; the control and voting rights of
major shareholders; other relationships between controlling share-
28 See Ruben Lee, Politics and the Creation of a European SEC: The Optimal UK
Strategy-Constructive Inconsistency 23 (Sept. 2005), available at
http://ideas.repec.org/p/fmg/fmgsps/sp161.html (noting universal agreement
among EU securities markets of the burden caused by the overwhelming number
of regulatory initiatives).
29 Modernising Company Law, supra, note 7, at 3-5.
30 Id. at 3.
31 Id. at 5.
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holders and the company; and material transactions with third par-
ties.32 In addition, the Communication expresses the view that
"shareholders of listed companies should be provided with elec-
tronic facilities to access the relevant information in advance of
General Meetings." 33 It also advocates confirmation of the collec-
tive responsibility of board members for key non-financial state-
ments, 34 and disclosure of director remuneration policy and the
remuneration of individual directors. 35
Company law reform, particularly reform that touches on the
power relationships between management, directors and share-
holders has been slow to come into effect in the EU, in part because
of serious differences between the U.K. and Germany and other
Continental countries with regard to the relative rights of share-
holders and other corporate constituencies, particularly labor.
These differences came to the fore in the battles over the Thirteenth
Takeover Directive.36 It is ironic that the defeat of this directive
and its ultimate passage in a greatly watered down version led to
the Report of a High Level Group of Company Law Experts, 37
which in turn led to the Communication on Modernizing Com-
pany Law. Even if the substantive recommendations in this Com-
munication are not adopted for a long time, it is possible that the
disclosure recommendations will become effective through actions
by securities regulators, engaged in implementation of the Pro-
spectus, Transparency and Market Abuse Directives.
32 Id. at 12.
33 Id. at 13.
34 Id. at 16.
35 Id.
36 See Ernesto Hernandez-Lopez, Bag Wars and Bank Wars, The Gucci and Ban-
que National de Paris Hostile Bids: European Corporate Culture Responds to Active
Shareholders, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 127, 175-81 (2003) (explaining the rea-
sons behind the failure of the Thirteenth Takeover Directive to gain approval); see
also Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council on
Takeover Bids, at 1-2, COM (2002) 534 final (Oct. 2, 2002) (describing the opposition
that grew to the Thirteenth Directive from some Member States), Council Direc-
tive 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC) (making new directive).
37 THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF Co. LAW EXPERTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMM'N,
REPORT ON A MODERN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE
(Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/
company/ company/modern/consult/ report-en.pdf [hereinafter HIGH LEVEL
GROUP REPORT].
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3. THE PROSPECTUS, TRANSPARENCY, AND MARKET ABUSE
DIRECTIVES
3.1. The Prospectus Directive
The Prospectus Directive is intended to play a key role in creat-
ing a single market for financial services in the EU. It seeks to im-
pose a comprehensive disclosure regime on all EU jurisdictions of
uniform application. Member states may not impose additional
requirements. This has therefore been called a "maximum har-
monization" initiative. 38 The aim of the directive is to ensure in-
vestor protection and market efficiency, in accordance with high
international regulatory standards. The Prospectus Directive
overhauls two prior prospectus directives which were largely un-
successful in facilitating the raising of capital across borders in the
EU because of an absence of harmonized procedures and inconsis-
tent interpretations and implementations in Member States. Al-
though the structure of the directive is similar to the structure of
the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") 39 the United States and
EU legal regimes have not been harmonized.
The Prospectus Directive relies on the "single passport for issu-
ers" concept, whereby a prospectus approved by one competent
authority will be required to be accepted throughout the EU, with-
out additional approval or administrative arrangements by other
Member States. Although the prior prospectus directives also em-
bodied the single passport concept, language translation and other
requirements could be imposed by host country regulators. There-
fore, prior directives failed to bring into effect a single document
for use in offerings throughout the EU. The difference is that the
new Prospectus Directive formulates a "maximum harmoniza-
tion," rather than a "minimum harmonization" regime.
The Prospectus Directive identifies two circumstances where a
prospectus is required to be published: first, before an offer of se-
curities is made to the public and second, before securities are ad-
mitted to trading on a regulated market. Prior to this Prospectus
Directive, there were different definitions across the EU as to what
constituted a "public offer." There is now a pan-European defini-
38 See ELis FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 138-208 (2004) (de-
scribing a new world securities disclosure regime in a framework of maximum
harmonization).
39 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000).
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tion which is "a communication to persons in any form and by any
means, presenting sufficient information on the terms of the offer
and the securities to be offered, so as to enable an investor to de-
cide to purchase or subscribe to these securities." 40 Resales are re-
garded as separate offers.
The Prospectus Directive does not apply to certain securities,
for example, non-equity securities issued or guaranteed by a Mem-
ber State or a Member State's regional or local authority, offerings
by central banks, or certain offerings by credit institutions.41 Nev-
ertheless, it will apply to Eurobonds and convertible bonds. Offer-
ings to "qualified investors," or to fewer than one hundred natural
or legal persons per Member State who are not qualified investors,
are exempt from prospectus obligations, as are offerings where the
minimum subscription commitment is 50,000 euros. The concept
of a "qualified investor" under the Prospectus Directive is similar
to the concept of an "accredited investor" under U.S. law, but the
definition of an accredited investor under SEC regulations is
broader.42
For individuals to be characterized as "qualified investors,"
under the Prospectus Directive they must meet two of the follow-
ing three criteria: 1) the investor has carried out transactions of a
significant size on securities markets at an average frequency of at
least ten per quarter over the previous four quarters; 2) the size of
the investor's securities portfolio exceeds 0.5 million euros; or 3)
the investor works or has worked for at least one year in the finan-
cial sector in a professional position which requires knowledge of
securities investment. The definition of an accredited investor in
the United States includes natural persons with a net worth of $1
million, natural persons with income of over $200,000 in each of
the two most recent years, trusts with assets of at least $5 million,
and any officer, director or general partner of the issuer of the se-
curities being offered. Also, in the United States this exemption
does not permit the issuer to engage in any form of advertising or
public solicitation. There is no such restriction in the EU. Another
40 Prospectus Directive, supra note 11, art. 2(1)(d), at 69. The definition of the
term "offer" in the Securities Act is broader. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(a)(3) ("The term
'offer for sale,' or 'offer' shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or so-
licitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.").
41 Prospectus Directive, supra note 11, art. 2, at 69. There are similar provi-
sions exempting certain securities from SEC registration in the Securities Act. E.g.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2), (a)(5) & (a)(12).
42 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2005).
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major difference between the SEC exemption and the Prospectus
Directive exemption is that the United States has a 35 non-
accredited purchaser limit, while the EU allows for up to 100 "non-
qualified" investors per Member State. Currently there are 25
Member States in the EU; therefore, the Prospectus Directive's ex-
emption can result in more than 2,500 "non-qualified investors"
compared to only 35 unaccredited investors allowed in the United
States.
In addition to the qualified investor exemption, the Prospectus
Directive has a small offer exemption, defined as offers where the
total consideration is less than 2,500,000 euros within a twelve
month period, or for the publication of a prospectus within a single
state, offers of securities with a total consideration of less than
100,000 euros within a twelve month period.43 In the United States,
by comparison, the small offering exemption under the securities
laws caps the dollar amount of exempt offerings at $5 million dol-
lars.44 There are two small offer exemptions under SEC regula-
tions: small offerings up to $1 million dollars that are registered
within a state and offerings of $5 million of restricted securities to
no more than thirty-five unaccredited investors.45
The Prospectus Directive does not specify the detailed form
and content of prospectuses, but an EU Implementing Regulation
prescribes content and format schedules for equity, debt and other
types of securities.46 This is a Level two regulation developed pur-
suant to the Lamfalussy Process, and it is what gives teeth to the
maximum harmonization concept because EU regulations, unlike
directives, are self-executing. The EU disclosure standards thus
put in place are intended to be in accordance with the International
Disclosure Standards approved in 1998 by the International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions, and already adopted by the
SEC in revisions to its foreign issuer disclosure requirements. 47
The EU Regulation implementing the Prospectus Directive
provides for incorporation by reference of information already dis-
43 Prospectus Directive, supra note 11, arts. 1(2)(h) & 3(2)(e), at 69-71.
44 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
45 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-505 (2005).
46 Commission Regulation 809/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 149) 1 (EC).
47 International Disclosure Standards, Securities Act Release No. 7745, 64 Fed.
Reg. 53,900 (Oct. 5, 1999). This Form applies to foreign issuers in the SEC disclo-
sure regime. The SEC believed that its requirements for U.S. issuers exceeded In-
ternational Organization of Securities Commissions' ("IOSCO") international
standards.
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closed by an issuer in annual or interim financial reports and cer-
tain other documents.48 The extent to which such incorporation by
reference will be utilized is unclear since the Commission's regula-
tion warns that the aim of incorporation by reference is to reduce
costs, but also to ensure investor protection. These aims will occur
in "accordance with high regulatory standards adopted in the rele-
vant international fora" and should not interfere with interests the
prospectus is meant to protect.49 The disclosure requirements for
prospectuses are located in annexes to the Commission's regula-
tion. It is noteworthy that one of these requirements is trend in-
formation "expected to have a material effect on the company's fi-
nancial condition and results of operations in future periods."50
Although the thrust of this requirement is similar to the SEC's
requirements for management's discussion and analysis
("MD&A") of financial condition and results of operations, the
SEC's regulation is considerably more fulsome.51 Whether the se-
curities regulators that review prospectuses in the twenty-five dif-
ferent EU jurisdictions will interpret and enforce this requirement
similarly or whether the discussion of trends in EU prospectuses
will use the same kind of language and format as the MD&A in
U.S. prospectuses remains to be seen.
The inclusion of an MD&A in financial reports has become an
international standard. International Organization of Securities
Commissions ("IOSCO") has noted that corporate financial col-
lapses in the first few years of the twenty-first century "highlighted
the need for improved disclosure and transparency" and the
MD&A "provides a context within which... the financial state-
ments can be interpreted."5 2 According to IOSCO, the MD&A pro-
vides information about the components of a company's earnings
and cash flow.5 3 Such disclosure of management's assessment of
factors and trends which are anticipated to have a material effect
on the company's future financial condition and operations enables
48 Prospectus Directive, supra note 11, art. 11(1), at 75.
49 Id. pmbl. 10, at 65.
50 Id. at 84.
51 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2005) (regulating management's discussion and
analysis).
52 TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
REGARDING DISCLOSURE OF MANAGEMENTS' DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL
CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS 2 (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD141.pdf.
53 Id. at 3.
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investors to look at the company through the eyes of manage-
ment.54 Accordingly, the convergence between U.S. and EU in the
MD&A portions of disclosure documents will influence disclosure
throughout the global capital markets.
Under the Prospectus Directive, each issuer has a "home Mem-
ber State" and the "competent authority" or chosen securities regu-
lator in that country will process the issuer's disclosure documents.
For all EU issuers, the home Member is the Member State where
the issuer has its registered office.55 Non-EU issuers can choose a
home Member State.56 Once the competent authority in the home
Member State approves the prospectus, because the legal regime
has become one of "maximum harmonization," a securities regula-
tor in another EU Member State cannot impose additional disclo-
sure requirements.57
Another significant change wrought by the Prospectus Direc-
tive is that stock exchanges were deprived of their prior role in
many European countries in vetting prospectuses. This is because
the Prospectus Directive requires that only one supervisory author-
ity in each Member State be designated to review and approve
prospectuses, and that the authority should be "independ[ent]
from economic actors."58 This is to guarantee the avoidance of con-
flicts of interest.5 9 Since EU Member States now have government
securities regulators who are members of CESR, these regulators
presumably will process prospectuses. The Prospectus Directive
therefore substitutes one competent administrative authority in
each Member State for the approximately forty regulatory organi-
zations (before the 2004 enlargement) previously coordinating the
vetting of securities offering documents. Administrative authori-
ties in each Member State are permitted, however, to delegate
some powers to exchanges so long as ultimate responsibility re-
mains with the administrative authority. This change reflects one
of the fundamental policy underpinnings of the Prospectus Direc-
tive (separation of the supervisory body from the market it is su-
pervising).
There is an important difference between the EU Prospectus
54 Id.
55 Prospectus Directive, supra note 11, art. 2(m), at 70.
56 Id.
57 Id. art. 17, at 78.
58 Id. pmbl. 37, at 67.
59 Id.
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Directive and the Securities Act. The Securities Act contains civil
liability provisions permitting either the SEC or private parties to
sue issuers and their officers, directors, and advisors for failures to
register securities or for false or misleading disclosures in prospec-
tuses.60 The EU Prospectus Directive merely provides that Member
States have to "ensure that responsibility for the information given
in a prospectus attaches at least to the issuer, or its administrative,
management or supervisory bodies, the offeror, and the person[s]"
requesting listing of the issuer's securities. 61 Whether such respon-
sibility is enforced by governmental prosecutors or private parties
is left to the national law of the twenty-five EU countries.
3.2. The Transparency Directive
Many U.S. commentators on the federal securities laws have
bemoaned the accidental passage of the Securities Act regulating
securities distributions prior to the passage of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") 62 regulating annual and peri-
odic disclosures by public companies.63 A variety of reforms at-
tempting to integrate the Securities Act and the Exchange Act have
been advocated over the years, and the SEC has acted administra-
tively to achieve as much integration of the two statutes as possi-
ble. 64 Such reform is ongoing, but a move to company registration
has not been possible. The EU seems to have copied the same
60 Rescission is available to purchasers of securities sold in unregistered
transactions in violation of the registration provisions pursuant to section 12(a)(1)
of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (2000). The issuer and specified persons
participating in a registered offering are liable for damages under Section 11 of the
Securities Act for materially false or misleading statements in a registration state-
ment. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000). Additional liability for fraudulent statements is con-
tained in section 17(a) of the Securities Act for suits brought by the SEC. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). Both the SEC and private plaintiffs can bring suits
for damages under section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(a)(2) & 78j(b) (2000 & Supp. II
2002). Exempt securities and securities sold in exempt transactions are also sub-
ject to certain anti-fraud provisions.
61 Prospectus Directive, supra note 11, art. 6(1) at 73.
62 15 U.S.C. H8 78a-78mm (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
63 See Milton Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1340
(1966) ("In a coordinated disclosure law and its administration primary emphasis
should shift from the 1933 Act's sporadic, ad hoc disclosures to the 1934 Act's con-
tinuous disclosure system").
64 Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act
Release No. 50,624, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,649, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722 (proposed Nov. 17, 2004).
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structural problem that is embedded in U.S. law and has made the
Prospectus Directive relatively stronger and more detailed than the
Transparency Directive. Some integration of offering and annual
reporting is contemplated in the Prospectus and Transparency Di-
rectives. However, company registration and a comprehensive
unified regime for financial reporting by public companies across
Europe has not come into existence.
The Transparency Directive establishes requirements regarding
the disclosure of annual, periodic, and ongoing information by is-
suers whose securities (equity or debt) are admitted to trading on a
regulated market. Therefore, it is more limited in its scope than the
Prospectus Directive, even though various "new markets" in
Europe, as well as traditional stock exchanges, are considered
regulated markets. In other ways, the Transparency Directive cap-
tures more issuers than the Prospectus Directive because it applies
to non-EU issuers who have securities listed on an EU market. The
Transparency Directive establishes uniform financial reporting
standards and publication requirements among the Member States,
requiring EU issuers to publish financial reports within four
months after the end of the financial year. The reports must re-
main publicly available for at least five years.65
The Transparency Directive also prescribes the contents of the
annual financial report to include audited financial statements, a
management report, and a statement by responsible persons within
the issuer certifying the accuracy of the financial statements and
management report.66 A significant change made by the Transpar-
ency Directive is the adoption of International Financial Reporting
Standards ("IFRS") (formerly International Accounting Standards)
as the applicable disclosure standard for all issuers across the EU.
Consolidated financial reports, annual and half-yearly, must be
drawn up in accordance with the EU's regulation compelling the
adoption of IFRS.67
A troubling issue for U.S. and other non-EU issuers is whether
they will be compelled to report financial information according to
IFRS or they will be allowed to continue to use U.S. generally ac-
cepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). This will depend on
65 Transparency Directive supra note 12, art. 4(1), at 44.
66 Id.
67 Council Regulation on the Application of International Accounting Stan-
dards, 1606/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1-2 (EC).
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whether the EU will deem U.S. GAAP "equivalent" to IFRS.68
CESR has published a draft concept paper with regard to this mat-
ter,69 but the politics of this decision make predictions difficult.
Nevertheless, an agreement between the Chairman of the U.S. SEC
and the Internal Market Commissioner for the EU concerning a
roadmap to end the need for EU issuers to continue to reconcile to
U.S. GAAP70 should encourage the EU to find that U.S. GAAP and
IFRS are "equivalent." Although IFRS and U.S. GAAP are con-
verging, there are still significant differences between these two
systems.71 Even more importantly, there is no international body
to oversee auditing. The establishment of the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") in the U.S. pursuant to Sar-
banes-Oxley, makes convergence of auditing standards between
the U.S. and EU subject to some new and difficult dynamics. The
EU Commission's proposal for a directive on statutory audits has
been justified as "a basis for effective and balanced international
regulatory cooperation with oversight bodies of third countries
such as the [PSAOB]."72
The Transparency Directive as proposed would have required
quarterly reporting, but as adopted it only requires half-yearly re-
porting. On the other hand, disclosures may have to be made
more frequently because the Directive is based on a theory of con-
tinuous rather than periodic reporting and has provisions requir-
ing interim management statements about material events, and so
68 Transparency Directive, supra note 12, art. 23(4) at 53.
69 COMM. OF EUROPEAN SEC. REGULATORS, Ref. No. CESR/05-001, CONCEPT
PAPER ON EQUIVALENCE OF CERTAIN THIRD COUNTRY GAAP AND ON DESCRIPTION OF
CERTAIN THIRD COUNTRIES MECHANISMS OF ENFORCEMENT OF FINANCIAL
INFORMATION (2004), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/data/document/
05_001.pdf.
70 See Press Release, SEC Chairman Donaldson Meets with EU Internal Mar-
ket Commissioner McCreevy (Apr. 21, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2005-62.htm (describing a meeting in Washington, D.C. on April 21,
2005 between SEC Chairman William Donaldson and EU Internal Market Com-
missioner Charles McCreevy).
71 See generally PricewaterhouseCoopers, Similarities and Differences-A Com-
parison of IFRS and US GAAP 4-12 (Oct. 2004), available at
http://www.pwcglobal.com/gx/eng/about/svcs/corporatereporting/SandD-04
.pdf (highlighting the differences between the two frameworks).
72 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on Statutory Audit of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts and Amending
Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, at 2, COM (2004) 177 final (Mar. 3,
2004).
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disclosures may have to made more frequently than half-yearly. 73
In other ways, however, disclosure requirements have been made
more stringent. For example, a stricter regime has been put in
place for the notification by investors of the acquisition or disposi-
tion of major shareholdings.74 Although Member States have less
discretion to structure more lenient rules than previously, the
Transparency Directive is not a "maximum harmonization" direc-
tive. Member States are permitted to impose additional disclosure
obligations on issuers that are more onerous than those prescribed
by the EU Directives.
The Transparency Directive requires disclosures about major
shareholdings, 75 which can be likened to disclosure obligations un-
der U.S. law. Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
requires disclosure of transactions that result in any one person be-
coming the beneficial owner of more than 5% of any class of securi-
ties.76 Rule 13d-2 requires disclosure relating to any "material" in-
crease or decrease in the percentage of the class beneficially
owned.77 "Material" is defined as any acquisition or disposal of se-
curities equal to or greater than 1%.78 A beneficial owner is defined
in Rule 13d-3 as any person who directly or indirectly has voting
power or investment power over the security. 79 By comparison,
the Transparency Directive requires shareholders to disclose acqui-
sitions or disposals of shares of an issuer where the proportion of
voting rights of the issuer held by the shareholder as a result of the
acquisition or disposal reaches, exceeds, or falls below eight trig-
73 Transparency Directive, supra note 12, art 9, at 47.
74 Under the prior directive, the obligation was triggered at a threshold of
10%, 20%, one-third (or at the Member State's choice, 25%), 50%, and two-thirds
(or at the Member State's choice, 75%). Under Article 9 of the Transparency Direc-
tive these obligations are initially triggered at a lower first threshold of 5%, fol-
lowed by 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50%, and 75%. Id. art. 9, at 47. Member States
remain free to provide for further thresholds, including lower ones such as a 4%
threshold in the UK and a 2% threshold in Italy. Under article 12, investors are
required to disclose how much the shares represent in terms of voting rights and
capital, the date on which the acquisition or the disposition took place, and the
identity of the shareholder, including any person or entity entitled to exercise vot-
ing rights on behalf of the security holder. Id. art. 12, at 48. Overall, however,
Member States have much less discretion than they did under the former direc-
tive.
75 Transparency Directive, supra note 12, arts. 9, 10, at 47.
76 15 U.S.C. 78m (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
77 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2 (2005).
78 Id.
79 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (2005).
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gering thresholds ranging between 5% and 75%.80 These notifica-
tion requirements also apply to a natural person or legal entity en-
titled to acquire, dispose of, or to exercise voting rights.81 In the
U.S., beneficial owners must notify the SEC, the issuer and each ex-
change where the security is traded about changes in ownership.
The statement must identify the beneficial owner, the source and
amount of funds used to make the purchases, and the number of
shares of the security beneficially owned.82
If the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to
acquire control of the issuer, any plans or proposals to liquidate,
merge, or sell the assets of the issuer must also be disclosed. This
disclosure is the thrust of section 13(d), the underlying purpose be-
ing to alert other shareholders of a potential change of control.
Section 13(d) reports must be filed with the SEC within ten days of
the transaction. Notably, the Sarbanes-Oxley accelerated reporting
deadlines do not apply to section 13(d) transactions; they apply
only to section 16 insider transactions. 83
In the EU, relevant shareholders and owners of voting rights
are required to notify the issuer and the competent authority of the
issuer's home Member State about changes in ownership.84 Upon
receipt of the notification, but not later than three trading days af-
ter learning of the transaction, the issuer must make public all the
information contained in the notification.85 The notification must
contain the following information: 1) the resulting situation in
terms of voting rights, 2) the chain of controlled undertakings
through which voting rights are effectively held, if applicable, 3)
the date on which the threshold was reached or crossed, and 4) the
identity of the shareholder.86 Shareholders and owners of voting
rights must notify the issuer "as soon as possible," but not later
than four trading days after the shareholder learns or should have
learned of the acquisition/disposal. 87 The "should have learned"
language in the Transparency Directive places an affirmative duty
80 Id.
81 Transparency Directive, supra note 12, art. 9 (1), at 47.
82 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78m (2000 & Supp. II
2002).
83 See infra note 106 (explaining accelerated reporting deadlines).
84 Transparency Directive, supra note 12, arts. 9, 19(3), at 47, 51.
85 Id. art. 12(6), at 48.
86 Id. art. 12(1)(a)-(d), at 48.
87 Id. art. 12(2)(a), at 48.
397
U. Pa. 1. Int'l Econ. L.
on shareholders to monitor changes in their shareholdings closely
to determine whether they have reached a position requiring dis-
closure.88
The Transparency Directive also seeks to facilitate proxy voting
and to enhance shareholder involvement at general meetings by
updating EU law with respect to information provided to inves-
tors. Issuers must provide information on the time, place, and
agenda of meetings, make available a proxy form for each person
entitled to vote, and publish notices. They also must distribute cir-
culars concerning the allocation and payment of dividends and the
issue of new shares. The Transparency Directive also facilitates the
use of electronic means by allowing issuers to use electronic means
to communicate with shareholders.
Furthermore, a central aim of the Transparency Directive is to
create a single electronic network across member states. The com-
petent authority of each member state must now operate a system
for disseminating information about a particular issuer at a single
source and must now create a place for the central storage of regu-
lated information. The home member state must also require issu-
ers to use media outlets for the effective dissemination of informa-
tion throughout the EU. However, the absence of an European
securities commission with a mandate to develop an electronic dis-
closure system similar to the SEC's EDGAR system is an impedi-
ment to a harmonized EU disclosure system for public companies.
Just as the Transparency Directive does not harmonize the
means for dissemination of financial and other disclosures by pub-
lic companies, neither does it harmonize civil liability provisions
throughout the EU. Enforcement by either governmental or pri-
vate parties is left to national law. In the long run, this failure to
adopt uniform liability standards may undermine the entire disclo-
sure regime established by the Prospectus and Transparency Direc-
tives.8 9
88 In its draft technical advice, CESR reiterates this point, stating that natural
persons and legal entities must exercise a high duty of care when acquiring and
disposing of major shareholdings. COMM. OF EUROPEAN SEC. REGULATORS, Ref. No.
CESR/05/05407 ADVICE ON POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTING MEASURES OF THE
TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE, 38 (2004) available at http://www.cmvm.pt/
cooperacao.internacional/docscesr/05_407.pdf. CESR goes on to define that
duty of care as requiring parties to follow up on instructions that it has given and
to take active steps to establish whether or not and when the instruction was car-
ried out. Id.
89 Jeffrey B. Golden & Dorothee Fischer-Appelt, The EU Prospectus and Trans-
parency Directives - Toward A Unified European Capital Markets Regime, in INSTITUTE
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3.2.1. Language Requirements
A serious problem with past directives was that securities regu-
lators were able to insist upon the translation of a prospectus into
the local language. One of the ways in which the new Prospectus
Directive is designed to achieve better harmonization is that EU
member states can no longer compel issuers from another state to
translate their prospectuses, except that they may compel a transla-
tion of a summary into the host country's language. Prospectuses
can be issued in the language of the issuer's home state regulator,
or a language accepted by that regulator, or in a language custom-
ary in the sphere of international finance. While most cross-border
prospectuses will likely be published in English as a result, discus-
sion of this result was neatly sidestepped in the language of the
Prospectus Directive.90
Similarly, under the Transparency Directive, an issuer trading
only in its home member state may only disclose information in a
language accepted by the competent authority in that state. If the
issuer is trading in both its home member state and in one or more
host member states, then it must disclose information in a lan-
guage accepted by the competent authority in its home member
state and either a language accepted by the competent authorities
of its host member states or in a language customary in the sphere
of international finance. If an issuer is only trading in host member
states, then it may choose between the language accepted by the
competent authorities of the host member states and a language
customary in the sphere of international finance. While host mem-
ber states may try to impose these requirements to avoid "lan-
guage shopping," the result of these requirements will likely be to
increase the use of English in disclosure documents.
3.3. The Market Abuse Directive
The Market Abuse Directive 91 was the first directive to follow
the Lamfalussy Process and is interesting for that reason alone. In
addition, the changes it makes to the prior Insider Dealing Direc-
ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE (FOURTH ANNUAL) 19, 36 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 1460, 2005).
90 See FERRAN, supra note 38, at 165 (noting that the formulation avoids speci-
fying which European languages should be used, a potentially divisive political
issue).
91 Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (EC) [hereinafter Market
Abuse Directive].
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tive will improve continuing disclosures by public companies over
and above the requirements of the Transparency Directive. This is
because the Market Abuse Directive is based on the theory that the
prohibitions against insider dealing exist because such dealings in-
terfere with market transparency. 92
Accordingly, issuers must inform the public of insider dealing
as soon as possible. Further, an issuer may only delay the publica-
tion of inside information provided that such omission "would not
be likely to mislead the public and provided that the issuer is able
to ensure the confidentiality of that information." 93
In my opinion, this formulation has a better theoretical ground-
ing than the U.S. law against trading on inside information because
it links the obligation to make public disclosure with the prohibi-
tion against trading on inside information and does not depend on
the existence of a fiduciary duty to a purchaser or seller ignorant of
inside information held by the other side of the trade.94 One prob-
lem with the duty to disclose is that in the absence of an EU-wide
regulator or a completed single market for securities, there is no
obvious or agreed-upon method for disclosing inside information
effectively.
The Market Abuse Directive also has a provision analogous to
SEC's Regulation FD,95 which provides that when an issuer or
agent of the issuer discloses any inside information to a third party
in the normal course of his employment, it must make complete
and effective public disclosure of that information simultane-
ously.96 The Market Abuse Directive mandates that the issuer
posts this information on its web site, though whether such disclo-
sure will in fact inform market participants of that information is
an unanswered question.
Another difference between U.S. law and the Market Abuse Di-
rective is how each treats the reporting of transactions by officers,
directors, and principal stockholders and the existence of short-
swing profit prohibitions. In the U.S., section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act governs the disclosure requirements for directors,
92 Id. at 17.
93 Id. art. 6(2).
94 See Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information-A
Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 107 (1998) (arguing that the fi-
duciary duty theory is "unduly narrow" from a policy perspective).
95 SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2004).
96 Market Abuse Directive, supra note 91, art. 6(3).
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officers, and principal stockholders.97 Principal stockholders are
defined as beneficial owners of more than 10% of any class of non-
exempt equity security registered pursuant to section 12. Article
6(4) of the Market Abuse Directive is the EU corollary to the U.S.
section 16 reporting requirements. 98 This provision imposes dis-
closure obligations on "persons discharging managerial responsi-
bilities within an issuer or financial instruments" and "persons
closely associated with them."99 Persons "discharging managerial
responsibilities" include the issuer's administrative, management
or supervisory bodies and senior executives who have regular ac-
cess to inside information and power to make managerial deci-
sions. 100 Persons "closely associated" include spouses, partners le-
gally equivalent to spouses, dependent children, and relatives who
share the same household.101 However, unlike section 16(a) of the
Exchange Act, the Market Abuse Directive does not require benefi-
cial owners of more than 10% of any class of any equity security to
file reports disclosing changes in beneficial ownership.102 Fur-
thermore, member states may decide to exempt issuers from or de-
lay the notification requirement if the total amount of transactions
is less than five thousand euros for the calendar year.1°3 The total
amount of transactions is computed by summing up the transac-
tions made by persons discharging managerial responsibilities and
those closely associated. 1°4
Finally, section 16(b) of the Exchange Act requires the dis-
gorgement of "short swing" profits realized by directors, officers
and 10% beneficial owners of the corporation to prevent the "un-
fair use of information" which may have been obtained by insid-
ers.105  Shareholders may sue to enforce this law. The Market
Abuse Directive does not contain any such prohibition on profit
realization by insiders.
In the U.S., section 403 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 accel-
97 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 p (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
98 Market Abuse Directive, supra note 91, art. 6(4).
99 Id.
100 Commission Directive 2004/72, art. 1(1), 2004 O.J. (L 162) 70, 71 (EC).
101 Id. at 73.
102 But see supra note 74 (noting the specific percentages where reporting is
required by the Transparency Directive).
103 Commission Directive 2004/72, art. 6(2), 2004 O.J. (L 162) 70, 73 (EC).
104 Id.
105 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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erates the time for reporting insider transactions from the calendar
month plus ten days to two days after the transaction.10 6 Compara-
tively, the Implementing Directive requires all issuers to file insider
transaction statements within five working days from the transac-
tion date.10 7 However, issuers must comply with the rules of noti-
fication of the member state in which it is registered, which may
require the issuer to comply with a filing period shorter than the
five day ceiling imposed by the Implementing Directive. Addi-
tionally, member states have the authority to exempt issuers from
these disclosure obligations if the dollar amount of their transac-
tions for the year is less than five thousand Euros.'08 No such dis-
cretionary exemption exists in the United States.
In the U.S., the Sarbanes-Oxley amendments to the Securities
Act of 1934 impose electronic filing requirements on all section 16
reports. 09 The SEC must make these filings available on a publicly
accessible Internet site by the end of the business day following the
filing. 10 The EU Market Abuse Directive, on the other hand, sim-
ply states that member states shall ensure that issuers inform the
public "as soon as possible" of insider transactions; there is no spe-
cific manner by which competent authorities are required to dis-
seminate information to the public."'
Additionally, SEC rules require issuers who maintain a corpo-
rate website to post each statement reflecting insider changes in
beneficial ownership on its website by the end of the business day
following the filing of the statement with the SEC.112 The Market
Abuse Directive contains a similar requirement. EU Member
States must ensure that issuers post all information required to be
disclosed publicly on their Internet sites "for an appropriate pe-
riod," but the Directive does not specify the time frame within
which such posting should take place following the transaction." 3
106 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 403, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 788 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
107 Commission Directive 2004/72, 2004 O.J. (L 162) 70, 73 (EC).
108 Id.
109 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
110 Id.
111 See Market Abuse Directive, supra note 91 ("The competent authority may
issue guidance on matters covered by this Directive, e.g. definition of inside in-
formation in relation to.. . market manipulation.").
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Foreign private issuers (as defined in Rule 3b-4) are exempt
from the Exchange Act's section 16 reporting requirements." 4
Conversely, the Market Abuse Directive does not exempt securities
registered by a non-EU issuer from its reporting requirements. The
impact on U.S. issuers is expected to be de minimis, given that sec-
tion 16 reporting requirements are more stringent overall than the
EU's.
4. RECOMMENDED CLAP DISCLOSURES
The High Level Group Report endorsed disclosure as a "pow-
erful regulatory tool in company law."" 5 Further, the report noted
that information and disclosure is an area "where company law
and securities regulation come together." 1" 6 Accordingly, in a
number of areas, particularly in the area of remuneration, the re-
port took the view that the "form and level of remuneration of ex-
ecutive directors should be left to the companies and their share-
holders. "117 Nevertheless, among the reforms recommended were
the public disclosure of general remuneration policies for directors
and the actual remuneration of individual directors. 118
The similar recommendations in the Commission's Communi-
cation of May 2003119 were not translated into a directive, but
rather a non-binding recommendation. 20 This recommendation
urged member states to adopt measures with regard to director
remuneration in four areas: first, all listed companies should issue
a statement of their policies on directors' pay, including a break-
down of fixed and variable remuneration; second, directors' remu-
neration policy should be on the agenda of the shareholders' gen-
eral (or annual) meeting; third, the disclosure of remuneration of
individual directors should be detailed; and fourth, shareholders
should approve share and share option plans.121 These kinds of
disclosure and governance controls of management and director
remuneration exist in the U.S. under the SEC's disclosure require-
114 Id.
115 HIGH LEVEL GROUP REPORT, supra note 37, at 33.
116 Id. at 34.
117 Id. at 64.
118 Id. at 65-67.
119 Modernising Company Law, supra note 7, at 16.
120 Commission Recommendation 2004/913, at 16 2004 O.J. (L 385) 55 (EC).
121 Id. at 56-58.
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ments 22 and stock exchange listed rules implementing the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act.1 23 Whether the Commission's recommendations
with regard to these matters will become either a legal requirement
or a standard of conduct remains to be seen.
5. CONCLUSION
Although the EU Prospectus, Transparency, and Insider Deal-
ing Directives are patterned after the general framework of the
federal securities laws and the SEC's development of the law on
insider trading, the substantive provisions of the EU directives
have not been harmonized with U.S. law. Further, although much
has been accomplished in Europe to implement the FSAP over the
past five years, much remains to be done. Implementation of the
CLAP is at a very early stage.
The numerous directives adopted pursuant to the FSAP still
need to be implemented in the twenty-five countries which make
up the EU. Furthermore, when the directives become the law of
these countries, the laws will have to be enforced. Even CESR has
questioned whether the current institutions and regulatory agen-
cies of the EU, operating pursuant to the Lamfalussy Process, will
be capable of integrating the EU capital markets and establishing
uniform standards for financial regulations.
In a Preliminary Progress Report, CESR analyzed the work and
progress of securities regulators in implementing the FSAP.124 This
report has been put out for comment and it examines three ques-
tions: How integrated are the EU securities markets? What chal-
lenges are faced by CESR and what possible improvements could
be made to this network of regulators? What challenges are faced
by mutual recognition and what possible improvements could be
made to this regulatory technique? 125 The report suggests that
since CESR is obligated to deliver convergence of policy, supervi-
sion, and enforcement, there may be difficulties in realizing the
122 17 C.F.R. § 229.201 (2004).
123 See Order Approving NYSE and Nasdaq Proposed Rule Changes Relating
to Equity Compensation Plans, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,995 (July 3, 2003) (proposing rules
for NYSE and Nasdaq requiring stockholder approval of compensation arrange-
ments).
124 COMM. OF EUROPEAN SEC. REGULATORS REF. No. 04-333f, PRELIMINARY
PROGRESS REPORT: WHICH SUPERVISORY TOOLS FOR THE EU SECURITIES MARKETS, AN
ANALYTICAL PAPER BY CESR 2-3 (2004), available at http://www.kredittilsynet.no/
archive/sto/01/03/CesrrOO3.pdf.
125 Id. at 4.
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promise of the FSAP due to the diversity of powers and supervi-
sory intensity of securities regulators. Without greater conver-
gence and coordination, the trust necessary for mutual recognition
will not be sufficient and there will be an insistence by host coun-
try regulators to impose higher standards. Most of the problems
described in the Preliminary Report deal with prudential supervi-
sion, not disclosure regulation.
Some problems in the area of disclosure regulation were also
highlighted. With regard to some of the recent accounting failures,
there were cases in which the home country securities regulator
did not have the legal authority to require a change in accounting
standards. Therefore, host country regulators were obliged to re-
quire changes in cooperation with the SEC.126 Indeed, accountants
are regulated separately in different EU countries. This raises a
number of questions (outlined by CESR as follows): How can a
host country authority rely on a home country authority if the
power to require the disclosure of non-misleading information is
not granted to the latter? Should securities regulators have more
operational powers with regard to the application of accounting
standards? Does Europe have appropriate supervisory tools for
interpreting IFRS?127 These questions go to the heart of whether
the FSAP can be fully implemented pursuant to the Lamfalussy
Process without the creation of an EU-wide securities regulator.
Although Europe is now committed to a single language with re-
gard to financial disclosure in the form of IFRS, interpretation and
enforcement of these accounting principles is another matter.
There is no European-wide regulation of auditing, and authority to
regulate accounting failures is not given to all EU securities regula-
tors.
The CESR Preliminary Progress Report is concerned with dis-
parate enforcement by governmental securities commissions. Dif-
ferences in civil liability provisions available to investors wronged
by fraudulent disclosures are an equally serious problem. In the
U.S., Congress has attempted to harmonize private enforcement of
the securities laws through pre-emption.128 A similar effort to
harmonize the enforcement of directives in the EU is an unlikely
prospect. The securities class action is not an investor protection
126 Id. at 20.
127 Id.
128 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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mechanism that exists in Europe, and the possibility of imposing
liability in private litigation depends on the substantive law and
judicial systems in each of the EU member states.
One observer of developments in the EU has argued that de-
spite the UK's opposition to a European securities commission,
support for such an agency is growing and may accelerate because
of recent "no" votes on the proposed EU Constitution.129 In addi-
tion to the difficulties of harmonizing the laws of twenty-five EU
member states, a task which seriously impedes the development of
an EU-wide regime for public company disclosure, the absence of a
European securities commission makes convergence of EU and
U.S. law very difficult. The recent agreement between the U.S. and
the EU on a roadmap for convergence and mutual recognition of
accounting principles required the participation and assent of the
Chairman of the SEC and the Internal Market Commissioner of the
EU. 130 This agreement addresses a major issue affecting world-
class public companies, and realistically could not have been
achieved in negotiations between the U.S. SEC and twenty-five dif-
ferent European securities commissions. Most disclosure issues
are resolved by regulatory staffers operating at a lower level and
are even less likely to be negotiated successfully on a multi-agency
basis.
Since the capital markets are global, securities regulators and
supervisors will have to work together more closely and more co-
operatively than has been the case in the past in order to achieve
true convergence of disclosure regulations. 131 Financial regulators
in the EU have their hands full trying to implement the FSAP and
beginning to work on the CLAP. The U.S. SEC is still dealing with
the aftermath of the bursting of the technology bubble, the imple-
mentation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and putting into effect other
reforms in response to current problems in the U.S. markets. As
long as securities regulators are more attuned to political and eco-
nomic developments in their own countries than in the global
marketplace, convergence of disclosure policy will remain a distant
129 Lee, supra note 28, at 23-26.
130 See Press Release, supra note 70 (announcing efforts to promote investment
protection for foreign investors as well as to improve global accounting stan-
dards).
131 See Alexander Schaub, Address at the Euro Symposium: Financial Inte-
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goal. Moreover, if U.S. and EU disclosure regulations are to be-
come harmonized, there is a need for the EU to have a single regu-
lator at the EU level to negotiate with the U.S. SEC.
* *k */ *k * *
